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What is the Source of the
Male Marital Wage Premium?
Aaron Strike
ABSTRACT.  The male marital wage premium is the wage difference between married and
unmarried men.  This paper explores the potential sources of the male marital wage
premium using cross-sectional and time series regression models from previous economic
research.  The studies examined suggest three possible explanations for the marital wage
premium: marriage makes men more productive, marriage allows men to spend more time
in the labor market, and men who earn above-average wages possess certain characteristics
that make them more attractive in the marriage market.  The studies examined favor the
theories that men are more productive after marriage and higher wages increase the
probability of marriage. 
I.  Introduction
It is widely documented that married men earn significantly more than
non-married men in the labor market.  This wage difference is known as
the male marital wage premium.  The marital wage premium is observed
even when controlling for age, education, work experience, occupation,
and industry in almost every study.  Most studies find that the marital
wage premium is between ten and forty percent (Korenman and Neumark
1991, 283).  Although the existence of the marital wage premium is
almost universally accepted, there is much less agreement on its source.
There are a variety of explanations for why married men earn more
than non-married men.  The most plausible and most researched theories
on the source of the marital wage premium are the productivity theory
(marriage makes men more productive in the workplace), the
specialization theory (marriage allows men to specialize in the labor
market because they are able to devote less time to housework after
marriage), and the selection theory (married men possess unobservable
characteristics that make them attractive both in the marriage and labor
market).  This paper examines several empirical studies intended to
determine the source of the marital wage premium.  It conclude that the
marriage premium is most likely due both to an increase in productivity
after marriage and because men with high earnings potential are more
likely to be married.  
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II. Productivity Theory
Sanders Korenman and David Neumark (1991) conducted a study to test
the productivity theory.  Using data from the personnel file of an
unspecified large U.S. manufacturing firm, Korenman and Neumark
compared performance ratings and promotions between married men and
single men in the firm.  The data used were for white, male professionals
working in a single firm in the year 1976 (Korenman and Neumark 1991,
296).  The data allow Korenman and Neumark to control for occupation,
work environment, and other variables.  Korenman and Neumark found
that, overall, married men earned 12 percent more per year than single
men.  Controlling for job grade, married men earned only 2.5 percent
more than comparable single men (Korenman and Neumark 1991, 297). 
The results suggest that much of the marriage premium (about 80%) can
be explained by the fact that married men were more likely to hold higher
paying jobs in the company.
Korenman and Neumark also measured the performance of married
men and single men within the company.  The performance of each
employee was evaluated each year and reflected the employees'
"performance relative to the standards of the job and relative to others
performing similar work at similar levels" (Korenman and Neumark 1991,
297).  Each employee was evaluated by multiple supervisors to ensure
consistent ratings.  The study found that married men were more likely to
receive promotions and had a lower probability of separation from the
company (controlling for education, job grade, and experience).  Married
men were 34 percent more likely than single men to be promoted and 46
percent more likely to receive higher performance ratings than single men
(Korenman and Neumark 1991, 302).  Assuming that higher performance
ratings and probability of being promoted were due to higher productivity
in the work environment, it is possible that married men are in fact more
productive than single men in the workplace.  These findings do not,
however, rule out the possibility that employers discriminate in favor of
married men.
Korenman and Neumark (1991) also used data from the National
Longitudinal Survey of Young Men (NLSYM) to estimate the effects of
marriage on males' earnings by comparing earnings before and after
marriage.  The NLSYM surveyed men (ages 14 to 24) for fifteen years to
get data on employment status, hourly earnings, work experience,
marriage status, and education level.  Using a cross-sectional regression
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model (controlling for survey year, work experience, education level,
union status, age, occupation, and industry) Korenman and Neumark
found that married men earned about 11 percent more per hour than
never-married men and divorced men earned about 9 percent more than
never married men (Korenman and Neumark, 1991, 291).  Using a
longitudinal regression model, Korenman and Neumark found similar
results; men who were married between 1966 and 1980 earned 8 percent
more than men who did not marry in the same time period (Korenman and
Neumark, 1991, 293).  
One interesting finding in Korenman and Neumark's regressions was
that the marriage premium increased as time spent married increased. 
Wage growth for married men was approximately 2.3 percent per year
married in the first few years of marriage and between 1-2 percent per
year after that (Korenman and Neumark, 1991, 293).  Higher wage growth
during the early years of marriage could explain why divorced men
earned more than men who had never been married but less than men who
were still married.  The wage premium for divorced men seems to be a
result of the wage gains during their time spent married.  Korenman and
Neumark concluded that most of the marital wage premium could be
explained by increased productivity after marriage.  "Approximately
eighty percent of the estimated impact of marriage on earnings survives
the fixed-effects estimation" (Korenman and Neumark 1991, 296). 
Although Korenman and Neumark do not completely ignore the selection
theory, they estimated that it could only explain at most 20 percent of the
marital wage premium.
Peter Groothuis and Paul Gabriel (2010) tested the hypothesis that
married men are more productive when their spouses have achieved
higher education levels.  Groothuis and Gabriel assume that more
educated wives should have a greater impact on their husbands' marital
wage premium.  Using data from the 2000 U.S. Census of Population
(sample size of 92,905 couples) and the 2003 Current Population Survey
(sample size of 2,775 couples), Groothuis and Gabriel compared wives'
education level to their husbands' marital wage premium.  Groothuis and
Gabriel's regression analysis implies that as wives increase their
education level, the husband's wage increases as well.  An additional year
of education by the wife increased her husband's wages by up to 4 percent
when the husband had at least 16 years of schooling (Groothuis and
Gabriel, 2010, 1108).  Wives' education level had an insignificant effect
on their husband's wages when the husband had less than 16 years of
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schooling.  Assuming that wives' level of education is positively
correlated their husband's productivity, Groothuis and Gabriel's results
provide evidence to support productivity theory.
Martha Hill (1979) also examined the productivity theory as a
potential source of the marital wage premium.  Hill used a sample of
3,045 males from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics in 1976 to test the
effect of marriage on men's wages.  Hill's regressions revealed that
married men earned 25-30 percent higher wages than single men (Hill
1979, 591).  Introducing dummy variables for labor force attachment,
work history, on-the-job training, and worker qualifications had little
effect on the marital wage premium.  Hill also introduced a variable for
the number of children in the family and found that married men with
children received higher wages than married men with no children.  Hill
concluded that "It may be that workers with greater financial
responsibilities are more willing to work harder on the job and take
unpleasant jobs in order to earn more" (Hill 1979, 592).  According to
Hill, the marriage premium is a result of realizations married men acquire
after marriage.  Married men may feel that they need to provide for their
family, so they work harder to pursue raises and higher paying jobs. 
Hill's findings support the theory that marriage makes men more
productive.  
A study conducted by Eng Seng Loh (1996) found that marriage did
not make men more productive in the workplace.  Loh used data from the
National Longitudinal Survey of Youth Labor Market Experience
(NLSY) in 1990 to compare earnings of married and unmarried
self-employed men.  Assuming that marriage makes men more productive,
Loh hypothesized that there should also be a significant marital wage
premium for married, self-employed men in relation to single,
self-employed men.  Using data on self-employed men is beneficial
because it also addresses the possibility that employers discriminate in
favor of married men.  If employer discrimination is the source of the
marital wage premium, then married, self-employed men should not
receive a marital wage premium.  Loh's regression analysis showed that
married, self-employed men earn 11.89 percent less than single,
self-employed men (Loh, 1996, 584).  In this case marriage actually has
a negative effect on wages.  These results provide evidence to reject the
theory that marriage makes men more productive.  The results also imply
that employer discrimination is a potential source of the marital wage
premium.  One problem with Loh's study is that self-employed men are
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"more likely to understate their earnings to lower their tax liability" (Loh
1996, 583).  Another problem with Loh's study is that it does not address
the number of hours self-employed men work.  Single, self-employed men
may benefit from fewer family obligations compared to married,
self-employed men which could explain why single men in this sample
earned higher wages.  Although Loh's results give some weight to the
employer discrimination theory, the results more or less rule out the
productivity theory.  
The major assumption underlying the productivity theory is that
wages are based on productivity alone.  If promotions and pay are granted
based on productivity, it should be true that married men are more likely
to be promoted and are more likely to hold higher paying jobs (as a result
of increased productivity).  Korenman and Neumark (1991) provide the
best evidence for the productivity theory by showing that married men are
paid more, are more likely to be promoted, and hold higher paying jobs. 
Although it is not clear why marriage makes men more productive, it is
quite possible that Hill (1979) is correct in suggesting that married men
feel a sense of financial responsibility after marriage, which makes
married men work harder to provide for their families. 
III.  Specialization Theory
Hyunbae Chun and Injae Lee (2001) tested their hypothesis that marriage
allows men to specialize in the workplace because they can afford to
devote less time to household chores, and thus more time in the labor
market after marriage.  Using 2,686 sample observations from the Current
Population Survey (CPS) in 1999, Chun and Lee estimated the effects of
wives' labor market hours on the husbands' marital wage premium.  Chun
and Lee found that married men earned 29.7 percent more than never
married men (Chun and Lee 2001, 311).  Controlling for education level,
labor market experience, race, and location, Chun and Lee found that
married men earned approximately 12.4 percent more than single men
(Chun and Lee 2001, 313).  Assuming that marriage allows men to
specialize less in the household (because wives take on some of the
household chores that single men must do themselves), married men with
working wives should have a lower marital wage premium than married
men with non-working wives.  Chun and Lee used wives' labor market
hours as an independent variable to test the effects of wives' time spent
in the labor market on the marital wage premium.  Chun and Lee broke
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down the independent variable for wives labor market hours into three
categories: wives who work 30 hours or more per week, wives who work
less than 30 hours per week, and wives who are not currently working in
the labor market.  Chun and Lee found that married men with
non-working wives earned 3.7 percent more than married men whose
wives worked more than 30 hours per week.  They also found that the
marital wage premium decreased by about 0.1 percent for each additional
hour the wife spent in the labor market (Chun and Lee 2001, 313). 
Married men with non-working wives earned 31.4 percent more per hour
and married men with wives that worked 40 hours per week earned only
3.4% more per hour compared to single men (Chun and Lee 2001, 318). 
This suggests that the husband's marital wage premium depends on the
amount of time the wife spends in the labor market.  Assuming that wives'
household specialization increases as her labor market hours decrease
(household chores and labor market hours are substitutes), at least some
of the male marital wage premium can be explained by the specialization
theory.  The problem with Chun and Lee's study is that they did not
include variables for husbands' or wives' time spent on household chores. 
Without variables for time spent on household chores it is unclear
whether husbands actually devoted less time to housework (and more
time in the labor market) after marriage.       
Marcia Bellas (1992) also tested the specialization theory by
examining the effect of marital status and wives' employment on the
salaries of men.  Bellas used data from the 1984 Survey of Faculty
sponsored by the Carnegie Foundation for the Advancement of Teaching. 
The survey yielded 3,694 usable male respondents.  Bellas divided the
respondents into four categories: never-married men, previously married
men, married men with an employed wife, and married men with a
non-working wife.  Bellas's results were consistent with her hypothesis
that married men with non-working wives would have the highest average
salaries.  The average salaries for the four groups were: never-married
men ($26,000), previously married men ($31,000), married men with
employed wives ($32,000), and married men with unemployed wives
($34,500) (Bellas 1992, 612).  The results confirm that, on average,
married men earn more than never-married men and wives' employment
status has a significant effect on the marital wage premium.
Bellas also used regression analysis to examine the effect of wives'
employment status on their husbands' average education level and salary
rank.  The regression suggests that men with employed wives were 8.5
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percent more likely and men with non-working wives were 12.3 percent
more likely than single men to have a doctorate or professional degree
(Bellas 1992, 615).  Bellas concluded that marriage allows men to
specialize in the workplace, which explains at least some of the marital
wage premium.  Holding job type constant and comparing salary rank
among married men with working wives, married men with non-working
wives, and never-married men, Bellas found that men with employed
wives earn just over $1,000 more and men with non-working wives earn
almost $2,000 more than never-married men (Bellas 1992, 617).  Bellas
concluded that some men do see financial benefits from having a wife and
even more so if the wife is non-working (Bellas 1992, 618).  Although
these results provide evidence for the specialization hypothesis, Bellas
does not include variables for time spent on household activities for men
or their wives.  This makes it difficult to rule out the possibility that
marriage somehow makes men more productive.  Bellas also suggested
that men with non-working wives have a greater financial need than men
with employed wives, which may explain why married men work harder
(increase productivity) or are more likely to seek raises or higher-paying
jobs.
To test the specialization hypothesis Loh (1996) used data from the
National Longitudinal Survey of Youth Labor Market Experience
(NLSY) and included a variable for the number of hours wives spent in
the labor market.  Assuming that labor market hours and hours spent on
household chores are substitutes, men with wives who work less should
experience a higher marital wage premium.  Loh's findings actually
suggest the opposite; married men whose wives worked between six and
eight years during marriage earned 9.26 percent higher wages than
non-married men and married men whose wives worked less than two
years during marriage earned only 1.88 percent higher wages than
non-married men (Loh 1996, 579).  These findings provide evidence
against the specialization hypothesis. 
Assuming time spent in the labor market increases as education level
increases, husbands with more educated wives should have a lower
marital wage premium than husbands with less educated wives (if
specialization is the source of the marital wage premium).  Loh (1996)
tested this theory by comparing wives' education level with their
husband's wages.  Married men whose wives were college graduates earn
11.5 percent more, married men whose wives completed some college
earn 7.1 percent more, and married men whose wives were high school
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graduates earn 4.3 percent more than single men.  Married men whose
wives were high school dropouts actually earn 11.8 percent less than
single men (Loh 1996, 579).  If there is indeed a positive relationship
between time spent in the labor market and education level, Loh's findings
provide evidence to reject the specialization hypothesis.  Loh concluded
that wives' education level is positively correlated with the marital wage
premium because as wives become more educated, they improve their
husbands' time management and resource allocation.  According to Loh
the results suggest that the marital wage premium is a result of increased
productivity, not increased specialization.     
Joni Hersch and Leslie Stratton also tested the specialization theory
using data from the National Survey of Families and Households in 1995. 
Assuming that marriage allows men to specialize in the workplace, men
whose wives work should have a lower marital wage premium than men
whose wives do not work.  Hersch and Stratton surveyed a sample of
1,373 men and asked them to estimate the number of hours they spent on
nine different types of household activities: meal preparation, washing
dishes and cleaning up after meals, house cleaning, outdoor and other
household maintenance tasks, shopping for groceries and other household
goods, washing clothes, paying bills and keeping other financial records,
auto maintenance and repair, and driving other household members to
work, school, or other activities.  On average, married men spent
approximately the same amount of time (18 hours per week) on
housework as single men (Hersch and Stratton 2000, 85).  Cross-sectional
regressions that compared married men with employed wives to married
men with non-working wives found that married men with non-working
wives spent about two hours less on housework than married men with
employed wives (Hersch and Stratton, 2000, 88).  Although wives'
employment status clearly has some effect on the amount of time their
husband spends on household tasks, Hersch and Stratton concluded that
"specialization does not explain the substantial marriage premium in
hourly wages observed throughout the literature" (Hersch and Stratton
2000, 86).    
Robert Nakosteen and Michael Zimmer (2001) tested the
specialization theory by comparing male wages before and immediately
after marriage.  If marriage allows men to specialize in the workplace the
marital wage premium should be evident immediately after marriage. 
Nakosteen and Zimmer used a sample of 309 men from the Panel Study
of Income Dynamics (PSID) to test their hypothesis.  The regressions
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showed that men who earned wages that were .28 standard deviations
above the mean wage before marriage earned wages that were .29
standard deviations above the mean wage after marriage (Nakosteen and
Zimmer 2001, 207).  The results show that there was not a significant
increase in men's wages immediately after marriage, implying that
specialization is not the source of the marital wage premium.  Although
the marital wage premium is not evident immediately after marriage,
married men could see an increase in the marital wage premium over
time.  Nakosteen and Zimmer also found that men with above average
earnings before marriage were more likely to marry women with above
average earnings before marriage.  Nakosteen and Zimmer concluded that
men who earn average wages before marriage continue to earn average
wages after marriage.  The results provide evidence to reject the
hypothesis that specialization is the source of the marital wage premium. 
The problem with Nakosteen and Zimmer's study is that they assume
marriage has an immediate effect on wages; they do not test the effects
over time.  Additionally, the results give some weight to the selection
theory because men who earned above average wages were more likely
to get married. 
Kate Antonovics and Robert Town (2003) used a study on
monozygotic (identical) twins to test the specialization theory by
examining the effect of wives' time spent in the labor market on their
husbands' salary.  The data came from the Socioeconomic Survey of
Twins and included 31 sets of twins who differed in marital status. 
Assuming that the marriage premium decreases as wives spend more time
in the labor market, Antonovics and Town reported "the coefficient on
wives' full-time work experience to be negative" (Antonovics and Town
2003, 7).  If Antonovics and Town's theory is correct, the marital wage
premium should decrease as wives spend more time in the labor market. 
The regressions found that the coefficient on wives' full time work
experience is actually positive (but insignificant) and the coefficient on
marriage status remains consistent with cross-sectional results
(Antonovics and Town 2003, 7).  These findings imply that wives' time
spent in the labor market does not have a significant impact on their
husbands' wages, providing evidence against the specialization theory. 
Antonovics and Town gave an explanation similar to Bellas's (1992),
concluding that married men may be more productive in the labor market
because their income affects the well-being of the entire family
(Antonovics and Town 2003, 8).  
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The main problem with testing specialization as the source of the
marital wage premium is that most workers who are paid a yearly salary
do not control the number of hours they work.  Although marriage may
decrease the time a husband spends on housework, no studies found that
men spent more time in the labor market after marriage.  It is also possible
that husbands with non-working wives experience a larger marital
premium as a result of increased productivity.  If the wife is unemployed,
the husband is the sole provider for the household, which may increase
the probability that the husband will work harder to get a promotion or
secure a higher paying job.  Considering the previously mentioned studies
and the problems with testing the specialization theory, it seems that the
marital wage premium is not a result of increased specialization after
marriage.   
IV.  Selection Theory
To test the selection theory Nakosteen and Zimmer (2001) compared men
with above-average earnings before marriage to their spouse's wages
before and after marriage.  The regressions showed that men with
above-average earnings tend to marry women who also have above
average earnings.  The findings support the hypothesis of assortative
mating on the basis of earnings.  "Persons whose earnings are above
average, controlling for measured background factors, tend to find
spouses with similarly strong earnings traits" (Nakosteen and Zimmer
2001, 211).  Nakosteen and Zimmer conclude that marriage alone does
not increase earnings; it is just more likely that higher income individuals
will get married.
Peter Groothuis and Paul Gabriel (2010) tested the selection theory
by examining the effect of wives' education on their husbands' earnings. 
Groothuis and Gabriel predicted that "the differences between wives are
more important in explaining the marriage premium than the differences
between the husbands themselves" (Groothuis and Gabriel 2010, 1103). 
If Groothuis and Gabriel's prediction is true (men with higher earnings are
more likely to marry more educated women), then it would suggest that
the marriage premium should be higher for men married to more educated
women.  Groothuis and Gabriel found that there was a positive
relationship between the marital wage premium and wives' education
level (Groothuis and Gabriel 2010, 1108).  These findings support the
selection theory in that men with higher earnings were more likely to
10
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marry more educated women.   
Loh (1996) also tested the selection theory by comparing males' wage
growth rates to the probability of marriage using a sample of 879 men
(NLSY data) who were single in 1986 and either single or married in
1990.  Loh found that men with high wage-growth-rates between 1984
and 1986 were no more likely than other men to get married (Loh, 1996,
580).  Loh's findings provide evidence against the theory that men with
high earnings are more likely to get married.  The major issues with Loh's
study are that the sample size is relatively small, there was only a four
year gap between surveys, and high wage-growth rates do not necessarily
imply higher overall wages.  
Kate Antonovics and Robert Town (2003) tested the selection theory
using data from the monozygotic twin study previously mentioned.  Using
data on identical twins allowed Antonovics and Town to control for
unobserved characteristics that may make men more attractive in the
marriage market and labor market.  Assuming that identical twins possess
similar physical and mental characteristics, the twins should have roughly
the same earning potential regardless of marital status. Antonovics and
Town found that married twins earn 27 percent more than their unmarried
counterpart (Antonovics and Town 2003, 7).  The results from
Antonovics and Town's study imply that "marriage has a causal effect on
men's wages" (Antonovics and Town 2003, 1).  Antonovics and Town
concluded that selection into marriage based on unobservable
characteristics is not the cause of the marital wage premium.  
The studies conducted by Nakosteen and Zimmer (2001) and
Groothuis and Gabriel (2010) provide the best evidence in favor of the
selection theory.  The problem with the study conducted by Loh (1996)
is that it only compared wage growth rates to the probability of marriage. 
It is possible that men with high wages (and low wage growth rates) are
more likely to get married.  The twin study conducted by Antonovics and
Town (2003) was also inconclusive because the sample size was so small
and it did not address the possibility that twins may differ in traits other
than physical appearance that make them more attractive in the marriage
or labor market.  Overall, selection into marriage based on unobservable
traits and earnings seems to be a possible cause of the marital wage
premium.   
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V.  Conclusion
More than likely, the marital wage premium is a result of multiple factors. 
It is probable that no single theory completely captures the source of the
marital wage premium.  Considering all of the studies and empirical
results, the most plausible source of the marital wage premium is an
increase in productivity after marriage.  The productivity theory is
strongly supported by evidence from Korenman and Neumark (1991),
Groothuis and Gabriel (2010), and Hill (1976).  These studies imply that
marriage has a causal effect on men's wages.  It may be that married men
actually do feel the need to provide for their family so they work harder
and pursue higher paying jobs after marriage.  Although an increase in
productivity after marriage seems to be the primary source of the marital
wage premium, it is also evident that men with higher earnings are more
likely to get married.  Nakosteen and Zimmer (2001) and Groothuis and
Gabriel (2010) provide evidence that supports the selection theory by
showing that there is a positive correlation between males' income and
probability of marriage.  Although there is much more research to be
conducted, the sources examined favor the theory that the marital wage
premium is mostly result of increased productivity after marriage and
somewhat a result of assortative mating based on earnings.  
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